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COLONIAL LAW IN TROPICAL AFRICA: THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN ENGLISH, ISLAMIC AND CUSTOMARY LAW
J. N. D. ANDERSONt
Some of you may have seen in the New York Times, an account of
a speech made to the members of the South African Parliament by the
British Prime Minister. In this speech Mr. Macmillan spoke of the
awakening of a national consciousness among many formerly dependent
peoples, and more particularly of the strength of African national consciousness today. "The wind is blowing through this continent," he said;
and anyone who has visited Africa in the recent past will endorse this
statement. But Mr. Macmillan went on to say that Britain's aim in those
territories for which she still has responsibilities is "not only to raise the
material standards of life, but to create a society in which men are given
the opportunity to grow to their full stature"-on the foundation of
"Christianity and the rule of law as the basis of a free society."
We are concerned with the legal problems-complex and important
as they are-of these rapidly developing colonies. Recently I took part
in a conferences, under Lord Jenning's chairmanship, on "The Future of
the Law in Africa," at which we discussed the three systems-the English, the customary, and the Islamic-which co-exist in so many of these
territories today. But how, it may well be asked, did this situation come
about?
First then, the "English" law. When the English colonists first
settled in America, they were regarded as having brought the common
law with them. This was because it was previously a barbarous country,
in which no law which was considered worthy of the name was in force.
It is, indeed, on this basis that international lawyers normally distinguish
between countries which have seen settled, conquered or ceded; for where
a country which already possesses any adequate system of law passes, by
one means or another, under alien rule, the existing laws are regarded as
continuing in force unless or until they are specifically replaced.
Examples of all these phenomena may be found in Africa. But in
all those African territories which are, or were, parts of the British
Commonwealth, this consideration is of no more than academic interest
today, for in each the application of English law-within suitable limitsis now governed by some Order in Council issued by the Crown. And
t Professor of Oriental Law, and Director of Institute of Advanced Legal Studies,
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such Orders in Council commonly provide not only for the establishment
of a Court of Record (sometimes termed the Supreme Court, sometimes
the High Court) with "full jurisdiction, civil and criminal, over all persons and all matters," but specify that this jurisdiction shall be exercised
in accordance with the "common law, the doctrines of equity and statutes
of general application in force in England" on the relevant date. It must,
however, be observed that in several of the East African Colonies and
Protectorates the appropriate Order in Council provides first for jurisdiction to be exercised in conformity with the "Civil and Procedure Codes
of India and the other Indian Acts in force in the Colony," and only
thereafter in accordance with the common law, equity, and English
statutes of general application. The reason for this, of course, is that
in India much of the English law had been reduced, down the centuries,
to the form of statutory enactments-the Penal Code, the Evidence Act,
and the Contract and Transfer of Property Acts, for example-and that
many of these admirable codifications were adopted, initially at least, in
the East African Colonies, which were at first regarded juridically as an
extension of the Presidency of Bombay.
Such then, today, is the juristic basis for the application of English
law in those parts of Africa which are, or were, British Colonies, with
the exception of Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa,
where the Roman-Dutch law of the original Boer colonists still prevails,
although considerably diluted by concepts and principles derived from
the common law. And it is interesting to observe that the common law
and doctrines of equity have also been extensively adopted in the AngloEgyptian Sudan, which was never, of course, part of the British Colonial
Empire, although administered for some years almost exclusively by the
British. The basis for its adoption in that country-as originally in India-has been under the comprehensive umbrella of "justice, equity and
good conscience."
But to return to those territories which are our immediate concern.
Subsequent to the date of the relevant Order in Council, the English law
has, of course, continued to develop. To some extent this has been effected by what we may term Imperial legislation, whether in the form of
Orders in Council or statutes of the Parliament of Westminster, although
the application of the latter to Colonial territories has been chiefly limited
to legislation regarding matters such as British nationality which are of
general, rather than local, import. But the overwhelming majority of
changes in the law have been introduced by local legislation in the territory concerned, whether this was promulgated by the Governor, or by the
Governor in Council, or by the democratic procedures of the Legislative
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Council or House of Assembly. As a result it may be said, first, that the
majority of Indian Acts which were previously applied in East Africa
have now been replaced by local ordinances; secondly, that the greater
part, but by no means all, of the changes in law effected by legislation in
the United Kingdom have been reproduced in the Colonies by local enactments; and, thirdly, that the Colonial courts have tended to follow,
wherever possible, the trend of judicial decisions in England and Northern Ireland.
It must, however, be emphasized as strongly as possible that English
law has never been applied in these territories either rigidly or exclusively. It has not been applied rigidly, because the relevant Orders in
Council always provide something to the effect that the common law,
doctrines of equity and statutes of general application "shall be in force
in the Territory so far only as the circumstances of the Territory and its
inhabitants . . . permit, and subject to such qualifications as local circumstances may prove necessary."' It would, indeed, be a most interesting study to determine to what extent such provisions have in fact been
used to effect modifications in the English law-but such a study has
never yet been adequately tackled. Far more important, the English law
has never been exclusively applied, because the Orders in Council all include provisions to the effect that:
In all cases civil and criminal to which natives are parties, every
court shall (a) be guided by native law so far as it is applicable
and is not repugnant to justice and morality or inconsistent
with any Order in Council or Ordinance; and shall (b) decide
all such cases according to substantial justice without undue
regard to technicalities of procedure and without undue delay.2
All this primarily concerns what we may term the British courts (i.e.,
the Supreme or High Court of the territory, the magistrates' courts, and
the courts of appeal). But the overwhelmingly greater part of all litigation which concerns Africans is in fact conducted in a system of courts
which are called, according to the territory concerned, either native, local,
African or customary. Provision for these has been made by local ordinances, under which a whole hierarchy of such courts has been set up.
Sometimes, as in Kenya, there is no link whatever between the two systems of courts, the British and the African; sometimes, as in Tanganyika, an exceedingly tenuous link has been forged; and sometimes, as in
Nigeria, the two systems have been fully integrated. Where the systems
1.
2.

Quoted from the Tanganyika Order in Council, 1920.
Ibid.
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are kept separate and distinct, appeals from the native courts go to their
own appellate courts and then to British administrative officers-who
are felt, by their knowledge of the local languages and customs, to be
more competent to deal with such cases than are professional lawyersand these same administrative officers commonly enjoy wide powers of
revision. It is generally accepted today as an objective that the courts
must be integrated as soon as it is practicable, although administrative
officers must retain, for some years in the more primitive areas, the right
and duty to supervise, to exercise revisionary powers, and to transfer
cases in suitable circumstances, to the British courts. All such problems
were examined and discussed at two Judicial Advisors' Conferences, the
first held in East Africa in 1953, and the second in West Africa in 1956,
to which delegates were sent by almost all British territories in Africa;
and the recommendations of these conferences have led to a considerable
simplification of the chaos which previously existed in some territories
in the form of a positive plethora of possible reviews and appeals.
Broadly speaking, the law administered by these native courts is
precisely the "native law and custom" to which reference has already
been made. As a consequence, their jurisdiction is commonly limited to
"natives"-a term which is somewhat differently defined from territory to territory-while provision sometimes exists for including certain
immigrants who have adopted the manner of life of the indigenous inhabitants, or for excluding such natives as may have abandoned that
manner of life. In addition, the native courts regularly enforce what
may be termed local legislation in the form of Native Authority Orders,
and even territorial legislation in the form of such ordinances, or parts
of ordinances, as they have been specifically empowered to apply.
But what, it may be asked, of Islamic law? Where does this fit into
the picture in these territories; and how does it come about that it should
be applied in Africa at all? The best illustration, to my mind, is provided
by the way in which the Roman-Dutch law originally developed. I am
no sort of expert on this system, but the process, as I understand it, was
somewhat as follows: In those parts of northern Europe where it had
its origin, Germanic customary law previously held sway. Then, from a
certain date, the rediscovered Roman law began to infiltrate, chiefly
through the influence of the Church and the universities. Still later, the
Roman law was officially "received." But it was never, in fact, imposed
in its purity and entirety; instead, it was fused with the existing customary law, and a sort of amalgam of the two systems came into being.
Exactly the same thing has happened in Africa in regard to the law of
Islam, and in some areas is still happening today. Islam has penetrated.
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or is penetrating, many parts of the continent, and the influence of Islamic law is spread by Muslim merchants, holy men and members of the
religious orders. As a result the indigenous customary law has been influenced and interpenetrated in certain areas, whether to a greater or
lesser extent, by the law of Islam; and this tendency is strongest where a
native ruler has not only embraced Islam but attempted to impose its law
upon his people. But nowhere, in tropical Africa, has the imposition
been complete; for traces of the customary law survive even in the most
rigidly Muslim areas. In every Muslim locality, it may therefore be said,
the "native law and custom" today represents an amalgam, in which
sometimes the customary law, and sometimes the Islamic precepts, preponderate.
Broadly speaking, British territories in Africa may be divided, in
this context, into those in which the Islamic law is regarded, juridically,
as a variety of "native law and custom" and those in which the Islamic
law is regarded as a third, distinct system, alongside the English and the
customary law. Examples of countries where Islamic law has been administered as a form of native law and custom include, surprisingly
enough, Northern Nigeria prior to 1956. The same is true today of
Ghana, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Nyasaland-except, that is, within
the scope of certain ordinances which provide for the Islamic law to be
applied, as such, in these territories in certain strictly limited respects:
e.g., the Marriage of Mohammedans Ordinance, 1905, in Ghana (but this
applies only to those Muslims who register their marriages thereunder.
and scarcely any do); the Mohammedan Marriage Ordinance, 1905, in
Sierra Leone (but this applies only in the Colony of Freetown, not the
Protectorate); the Marriage and Divorce of Mohammedans Ordinance,
1906, in Uganda (but this makes no provisions regarding succession) ;
and the Asiatics Marriage and Divorce Ordinance, 1929, in Nyasaland
(but this, by definition, does not apply to indigenous Muslims).
Examples of territories where the Islamic law is regarded as a third,
distinct system, on the other hand, are provided by Somaliland, Kenya
and Zanzibar. In Somaliland both Qadis' courts and other subordinate
courts have been set up, each concerned with a different system of law.
In Kenya, again, both Muslim courts and African tribunals exist, while
there is also a Marriage and Divorce of Mohammedans Ordinance. In
Zanzibar, by contrast, Islamic law virtually divides the field with local
statute law, but provisions also exist for the application of customary law.
Betwixt and between these two categories of territories, as it were,
lie the Gambia in the West and Tanganyika in the East. Gambia represents, in this respect, what may be described as the "tidiest" arrangement
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to be found in any of these territories, for the Mohammedan Law Recognition Ordinance, 1905, provides for the application of Islamic law in the
colony of Bathurst, under Islamic rules of procedure and evidence, in all
matters of marriage, divorce, guardianship and succession concerning
Muslim litigants. Subsequent legislation has set up a second Qadis'
court, with similar jurisdiction, in the neighboring area of Kombo St.
Mary; and the Native Tribunals Ordinance, 1933, which provides for
the enforcement of native law and custom throughout the Protectorate
of the Gambia, allows for the application of Islamic law there also, in
matters of marriage, divorce, guardianship and succession, when the
parties are Muslims. In the first case, it may be said, the law which is
in fact applied approximates to the pure Maliki doctrine, while in the
second it represents a heterogeneous amalgam between customary law and
the doctrines of Islam, compounded according to the knowledge and inclination of the court concerned. Somewhat the same situation obtains
in Tanganyika, but on a less orderly juristic foundation. For here only
the Administration (Small Estates Amendment) Ordinance, 1947, specifically provides for the application of Islamic law-in matters of succession alone, and with certain important reservations-in regard to the
indigenous population, while the Asiatics (Marriage, Divorce and Succession) Ordinance, 1947, applies only to Asiatics. For the rest, Islamic
law is applied to Muslim litigants largely at the discretion of the Liwalis'
courts, or of the other local courts concerned.
It is noteworthy in this context that where Islamic law is regarded
as a variety of native law and custom, it is, naturally, applied under the
legislation providing for the latter-except, that is, within the scope of
some of the particular ordinances we have noted. Where, on the other
hand, it is regarded as a distinct system, it is applied either as the law
which was in force before the territory was conquered or the Protectorate
was established (as in Tanganyika, Zanzibar and Somaliland) orstrangely enough-it is applied, in British courts, under Bombay Regulation IV of 1827, section 26. This section provides for the application,
in default of some relevant statute, of the custom of the country, the "law
of the defendant" or "justice, equity and good conscience," and has always been regarded as opening the door, in suitable circumstances, to the
personal or religious law of the litigants. This Regulation became applicable to Zanzibar and Somaliland when the legislation of the Bombay
Presidency was extended to parts of East Africa.
It is also interesting to observe that in Zanzibar Islamic law is specifically proclaimed as the "fundamental law" in the Sultan's courts, except where excluded by local legislation, whereas in Northern Nigeria
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the Islamic law was not so much as mentioned in any legislative enactment, prior to 1956, except (quite incidentally) in the Sheriff's and Enforcement of Orders Ordinance, 1945. Yet in Zanzibar the Islamic
law has, in fact, been excluded from the whole field of crime and procedure and much of the field of contract and commerce, by the Sultan's
Decrees, while in parts of Northern Nigeria it has enjoyed a more extensive enforcement than anywhere else in the world outside Arabia or Afghanisan, but under the comprehensive umbrella of "native law and
custom."
Yet again, whereas in the Kenya Protectorate the Muslim courts are
regarded as forming part of the British hierarchy of courts, in Tanganyika the Liwalis' courts are considered to be part of the local courts system. And this, in turn, leads not only to a difference in the relevant
chain of appeals, but also to a fundamental distinction in regard to the
rules of evidence and procedure which these courts are required to observe.
It seems plain, therefore, that the Golden Text, in the British
Colonial Empire, has been "let not thy right hand know what thy left
hand doeth," for somewhat similar problems have received a different
treatment in almost every territory. But however "untidy," and in some
ways undesirable, this may seem, it at least means that the solution has
nowhere been doctrinaire, but pragmatic, and it should at least bear some
relation to local circumstances.
The question necessarily obtrudes itself, however, as to whether it
is preferable to regard the Islamic law as identical with native law and
custom, or as a distinct and separate system. To the purist it may, of
course, appear most inappropriate to identify a law which was brought
to full maturity, centuries ago, in Arabia or Spain as the native law of
an African people today. But we have already seen how the Islamic
law has in some areas infiltrated the customary law and become fused
therewith. The expedient of treating it as a variety of this law has many
advantages, for it covers, equally, a law which approximates to the classical doctrine in the most strongly Muslim areas, a law which is frankly
pagan in the areas to which Islam has not penetrated, and a variety of
amalgams in those districts which are of more mixed or indeterminate
allegiance.
Let us now turn to the question of conflicts between these different
systems of law, and how they are resolved. First, then, in conflicts between the Islamic and the customary law, we must again distinguish those
countries where the Islamic law is regarded as a variety of native law
and custom from those where it is administered as a distinct system. In
the former such conflicts can largely be left to the courts and the people-
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as, for example, in the Native Tribunals of the Gambia. This represents
a considerable advantage; and it is just here that the particular genius
of native courts makes itself felt, and they are able to make special concessions, at times, to Muslim litigants in a way that British courts could
scarcely attempt to emulate. For the native courts are less concerned to
enunciate and enforce clear-cut propositions of law than to reach an
equitable solution to the individual case-a solution based on legal principles, but with a flexibility of adjustment designed to preserve the social
equilibrium and satisfy both the parties and the public.
Where, on the other hand, the Islamic law is applied as a distinct
system, this solution is not possible. Instead conflicts are avoided, in
Somaliland for example, by the fact that different types of cases are
tried by different courts. Matters concerning the contract of marriage,
the pronouncement of divorce and questions of testate and intestate succession, for instance, lie within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Qadis'
courts, which administer the Islamic law (with very minor concessions, at
times, to local customs) ; whereas disputes about such matters as brideprice and adultery go to the other "subordinate courts," where Somali
customary law (influenced as this has been, in part only, by the law of
Islam) regularly prevails. In Kenya and Tanganyika, on the other hand,
statutory provisions exist for deciding whether the Islamic or the customary law is to be applied in matters of succession. In Kenya the Islamic law is to be applied in this regard only where the deceased not only
died a Muslim but was either the child of a Muslim marriage or one who
had himself contracted such a marriage (i.e., was either a second-generation Muslim or one who had shown some indication of intending to follow the Islamic way of life). In Tanganyika a distinction is made between "Swahilis" (i.e., those who have adopted a semi-Arab culture) and
members of African tribes, for in the former case the Islamic law and in
the latter the customary law, is to apply-unless, in each instance, the
court is satisfied, from the statements or way of life of the deceased individual, that he intended the contrary solution.
Secondly, what of conflicts between the Islamic and the English law?
Here the obvious example is Northern Nigeria, where even homicide
cases may be tried either in the British courts under English law as codified in the Nigerian Criminal Code, or under Islami6 law in its Maliki
variety, in the court of some Emir who still has the right to try capital
cases-and it is often largely a matter of chance in which court, and
therefore under which law, the accused is in fact prosecuted. The definition of what we may term "capital homicide" in the Maliki law, moreover, is considerably wider than in the English law. Circumstances of
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extreme provocation are normally regarded as irrelevant. The death
penalty commonly depends on the caprice of the "heirs of blood"-except
that they can never demand the execution of a Muslim for the dispatch of
a non-Muslim; and the relevant rules of evidence are fundamentally different. The injustices which ordinarily result from such a system were
averted, in practice, by the right of British administrative officers to
transfer cases from the native to the British courts, by the right of appeal
to these courts, and by the governor's prerogative of mercy. But this
was by no means a satisfactory position on the verge of independence. It
was for this and many other reasons that the Northern Nigerian Government recently appointed a Panel of Jurists to consider, in the light of what
happens in other parts of the world where Muslims and non-Muslims live
side by side, how conflicts could be avoided between the different systems of law which obtain in Northern Nigeria, and to make such recommendations as seemed necessary to that end in regard to both the legal
and judicial systems. I had the honor to serve as a member of this Panel.
We recommended that the only practicable solution-and one, which had
already been adopted in all other countries where Muslims and nonMuslims live side by side-was that the Islamic law must be replaced, in
the whole sphere of crime and criminal procedure, by suitable codes of
general application. This recommendation has been accepted by the government, and is now in the course of implementation.
But the possible sphere of conflict between the Islamic and English
law is not limited to the sphere of crime, nor to Northern Nigeria (where
alone, in British Africa, this particular problem arises). Questions of
child marriage or compulsory marriage, of the exclusion of converts from
inheritance on the Islamic principle that there can be no inheritance between those who differ in religion, of procedure and evidence, of the
law (e.g., in regard to conspiracy) applicable to polygamous or potentially
polygamous marriages, and of whether decrees of restitution of conjugal
rights should be executed by force, all provide possible fields for conflict.
Thirdly, there is also the possibility of conflict between the customary and the English law. Here an obvious example is provided by
questions of land tenure, where the English law favors full rights of individual ownership and customary law favors a communal or family title,
coupled, as it may be, with individual rights of user. As in the case of
Islamic law, moreover, customary rules regarding child marriage, compulsory marriage and the implications of polygamous unions provide a
fruitful field of conflict, particularly where an African contracts a legal,
monogamous marriage under statute law and, at the same time, indulges
in additional unions of a customary nature. An interesting case of a
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rather different character, moreover, was recently reported from Northern Rhodesia, where an African member of the Roman Catholic Church
was initially convicted of a breach of native law or custom in persuading
other African Christians that it should be contrary to their conscience to
make those contributions of millet demanded by their chief which they
knew were to be used to propitiate his ancestors. It was admitted, curiously enough, that a Christian had now acquired the right himself to
withhold such contributions on grounds of conscience, but it was held
that to suggest a similar refusal to others still constituted an offence.
And although this conviction was in fact quashed on appeal, it provides a
fascinating example of possible conflicts where the traditional customary
law is exposed to the incursions of a new faith and different way of life.
Nor are these problems in any sense merely of an academic interest.
On the contrary, they are of vital moment in Africa today, where one
territory after another is rapidly advancing to independent status. What
is to be the law of the future? It seems obvious that a dual-or triplesystem of courts cannot be perpetuated indefinitely. But the question
remains as to whether a suitably modified English law is to prevail;
whether the indigenous law can be developed-as it is developing today
in certain areas-to the point where it can provide an adequate alternative; or whether some amalgam between the two is to evolve.
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